The proposal for “One Nation, One Election” has stirred significant conversation in India, calling for simultaneous elections to be held for both the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies. This Bill, backed by the current Union Cabinet has now been sent to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), aims to streamline the electoral process and reduce the frequency of elections. Proponents argue that it would enhance governance by ensuring that the political landscape remains stable throughout a government’s tenure. However, a critical question looms over this proposal: why should states be compelled to go to the polls when the central government falls?
Historically, between 1951 and 1967, India did experience concurrent elections, but the landscape has significantly changed since then.
The recent introduction of proposed Article 82A suggests that state assemblies could potentially have their terms curtailed to align with the Lok Sabha’s five-year cycle. This raises concerns about the autonomy and stability of state governments.
If a central government loses its majority and the Lok Sabha is dissolved, the quick recourse to fresh elections could lead to a mismatch in political stability across different levels of governance.
For many, the question of relevance is not merely academic; it impacts real governance. States would consequently be pressured to align their political fortunes with the whims of the central government. Why should the states, which have their unique needs and governance challenges, be subjected to the conditions of an unstable central government? In essence, it begs the question of whether local issues and regional interests might be sidelined in favour of broader nationalist rhetoric.
Additionally, the logistical implications of simultaneous elections could strain the administrative machinery at both the central and state levels. Holding simultaneous elections would require robust electoral management to ensure transparency and fairness across the board.
If one sector, say the central elections, were to face issues such as allegations of malpractice or delays, both the local and national democratic processes could be called into question, muddling governance across the board.
The argument that states should not have to vote concurrently with the centre aligns with the rationale behind federalism. India’s federal structure is built on allowing state governments to address local needs independently.
A central government’s dysfunction should not unduly burden states that might be otherwise functioning effectively. In a true democracy, it is essential for each layer of government to be able to operate on its own terms without undue influence from coordination logistics across levels.
Moreover, approximately 15 political parties have already voiced their opposition to the “One Nation, One Election” concept. This is a significant indication of the apprehensions prevalent among diverse political entities about the potential implications for India’s rich, multi-faceted democratic fabric.
While the desire for a streamlined electoral process under “One Nation, One Election” is commendable, it is crucial to weigh the potential ramifications carefully. States should not have to suffer election fatigue or political instability due solely to the circumstances of the central government.
Instead, the focus should remain on strengthening the structures of governance at all levels, ensuring that the voices of both state and national constituents are heard without undue overlap or pressure. Balancing these competing interests will ultimately lead to a healthier democratic process.
Proposed introduction of new Article 82A in the Constitution
The Bill seeks to add Article 82A to the Constitution. Sub-clause 1 of Article 82A provides for the appointment date on which the provisions of the Bill would come into force.
The President will do this through a public notification issued on the date of the first sitting of the House of the People after a general election.
Sub-clause 2, which is an important one, provides that notwithstanding anything in Article 83 and Article 172, the term of all legislative assemblies constituted in any general election held after the appointed date and before the expiry of the full term of the House of the People shall come to an end on the expiry of the full term of the House of the People.
This means that some state assemblies will have their five-year terms curtailed to pave the way for simultaneous elections.
Under Article 83(2), the House of the People, unless sooner dissolved, has a tenure of five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the House.
Likewise, under Article 172, the duration of state legislative assemblies is five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the assembly.
Interestingly, neither Article 83 nor 172 refer to mid-term elections.
